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Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate:  







Gulrajani, N. (forthcoming)  “Transcending the Great Foreign Aid Debate: 
Managerialism, radicalism and the search for aid effectiveness“ Third World Quarterly 
Abstract 
The Great Aid Debate pits those who are radically opposed to foreign aid against those 
who champion its reform to achieve greater aid effectiveness.   This paper offers an 
analysis of this debate by introducing a heuristic distinction between aid 'radicals' and aid 
'reformers'. The radical position is notable as it uncharacteristically unites neo-liberals 
and neo-Marxists against foreign aid, while reformers espouse the tenets of 
managerialism as an ideological and practical vehicle for aid's improvement.   Radicals 
remain skeptical and suspicious of reformist managerial utopias, while aid reformers see 
little value to radical nihilism. This paper calls for an end to the Great Aid Debate by 
moving to a discussion of foreign aid that intertwines both radical and reformist 
perspectives.  The 'radical reform' of foreign aid is both desirable and achievable so long 





 A “Great Aid Debate” has played itself out in popular books on the New York 
Times bestseller list but has escaped close analytic examination, even as this debate 
increasingly impinges on public perceptions of foreign aid and real development policies. 
The Great Aid Debate centers on the contested value of foreign aidi and the wider aid 
system as vehicles for achieving development.  Whilst economists continue to debate the 
question of aid’s impact on development as proxied by macro-level variables like growth, 
poverty and inequality, such conversations often degenerate into complex disagreements 
concerning the econometric analysis conducted to establish claims and positions. In 
contradistinction, the Great Aid Debate elevates and extends these concerns to the level 
of aid policy by asking whether aid is, on balance, a vehicle of harm or for good in 
developing societies.   Although largely a normative clash, this has not prevented either 
side of this debate from harnessing a substantial evidentiary basis to support their 
respective claims.   
 This paper offers an analysis of this Great Aid Debate by introducing a distinction 
between aid 'radicals' and aid 'reformers'.  This binary presentation of positions in the 
debate is offered as a stylized heuristic device that can nevertheless usefully tease out 
points of convergence and divergence within this debate.  On one side are aid ‘radicals,’ a 
heterogeneous group of voices straddling the political spectrum who exhibit apparent 
convergence in their opposition to foreign aid, particularly the way such flows are 
organized, managed and delivered by aid agencies.ii  On the other side, aid reformers 
represent many committed members of the development policy and academic community 
who believe corporate managerial reform to the aid system is both possible and desirable 
for improved development outcomes.  In the first and second sections, each of these 
positions is examined in more detail.  While an ideological split defines the radical camp 
and suggests more diversity than perhaps one might first assume, reformers remain 
relatively united in their belief that business managerialism is the main vehicle for 
ameliorating foreign aid.     
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 Once radical and reformist arguments are presented, section three asks whether 
there is a way to re-theorize aid and its administration such that it becomes less harmful 
than radicals suggest and more robustly improved than simplified managerial reforms 
imply.    The excessive pessimism of aid radicals and the unwarranted optimism of aid 
reformers has to date limited a productive and pragmatic conversation on future 
directions for aid, raising questions about the value of the divisive Great Aid Debate. 
Ending the Great Aid Debate becomes a desirable possibility with the continuities and 
discontinuities that separate radicals and reformers made transparent.  A way forward is 
offered by reconceptualizing foreign aid as an endeavor involving contested goals, 
commonsensical processes, contingent practices and civic values.  If foreign aid is ever to 
be truly effective, what is required is no less than its radical reform. 
Glass	  half	  empty:	  radical	  perspectives	  on	  aid	   	  
 Criticisms of foreign aid as both a mechanism and administrative apparatus for 
achieving higher living standards in the developing world are not new (Bauer, 1972, 
Escobar, 1993, Sachs, 1990, Montgomery, 1980).    What is different with contemporary 
critiques is the extent to which these arguments have achieved prominence in the public 
domain.  Nowadays, expressions of aid skepticism are both commonplace and a mainstay 
for a variety of professionals (including many former aid managers and bureaucrats).  
Nevertheless, the irony is that the radical perspective unites neo-Marxist and neo-liberal 
perspectives in denouncing foreign aid. Both sets of radicals now seem to agree that 
foreign aid is unnecessary at best, pernicious at its worst. Is this relatively downbeat 
assessment that emerges from highly divergent political starting points suggestive of a 
serious malaise with foreign aid?  Or are there differences that distinguish their respective 
pessimism over the prospects for aid?   
Radicals	  on	  the	  right	  
 Radicals on the right are strident in their criticisms of foreign aid.   Many have 
catapulted to public attention via bestsellers written by economists like Bill Easterly’s 
The White Man’s Burden and Dambisa Moyo’s Dead Aid.  These radicals maintain that 
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not only does aid fail to achieve its developmental aims, it creates dependencies that keep 
countries poor and even worsen the burden of poverty.  Aid crowds out investment by 
hindering the operation of free markets, encourages corruption and fosters reliance on 
foreign munificence to the detriment of self-help and innovation (Moyo, 2009).  The aid 
industry stands accused of having concentration ratios that approximate a carteliii and the 
planning mindsets of Communist apparatchiks (Easterly, 2002, Whittle and Kuraishi, 
2008). Public bureaucracies are lambasted for the way they have administered foreign 
assistance using the slow cumbersome and inefficient command-and-control approaches 
of state “planners” (Easterly, 2006b, Easterly, 2008).  Planning mentalities dominate the 
donor industry, and while this is claimed to be inefficient and ineffectual, it keeps the 
industry and its elites in business.  
Setting a beautiful goal such as making poverty history, the Planners’ 
approach then tries to design the ideal aid agencies, administrative plans, and 
financial resources that will do the job.  Sixty years of countless reform 
schemes to aid agencies and dozens of different plans, and $2.3 trillion later, 
the aid industry is still failing to reach the beautiful goal.  The evidence points 
to an unpopular conclusion: Big Plans will always fail to reach the beautiful 
goal (Easterly, 2006: 11). 
 The scope for improvement of the aid industry is limited for right-wing radicals.  
Easterly appears to advocate dismantling the public aid architectures privileging 
“strategies and frameworks” in favour of demand-driven aid agencies relying on the 
nimble “searching” of bargain-hunting venture capitalists looking for their next 
investment opportunity (2006b: 206-207).  He perhaps sees greater scope for reform than 
his counterpart Moyo, albeit involving revolutionary changes to the aid system.  In 
contrast, Moyo simply seeks to end the myth that aid is effective or can be made 
effective. Feeding the bureaucracies that sustain the Western aid industry is, for Moyo, 
not only unproductive but harmful and she actively calls for dismantling the industry 
altogether to reduce this harm.  In its place, she advocates market-based policies that she 
claims address the root causes of poverty, namely lack of access to capital and adequate 
trading opportunities.   Her aid-free solution to the problem of under-development in 
Africa thus relies on a combination of open trade policy, microfinance, bond market 
financing and Chinese investment (Moyo, 2009: xix, 74).  
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Radicals	  of	  the	  left	  
 As contemporary criticisms by economists like Easterly and Moyo raise our 
doubts about the efficiency and effectiveness of foreign aid, there is a tendency to gloss 
over critical perspectives in development studies situated in neo-Marxist anthropological 
and sociological traditions that share their aid skepticism but lack their public profile.  
Inspired by the social theory of Michel Foucault, this group argues that the discourse of 
under-development that is expounded by the aid industry represents poor countries and 
their citizens as hapless subjects in need of Western assistance, advancement and 
modernity as they are incapable of directing their own social and political transformation 
(Escobar, 1995a, Escobar, 1995b, Ferguson, 1994, Esteva, 1993, Rist, 2002). The neo-
colonial business of aid silences the autonomy and agency of local communities and 
citizens by the power of its representation such that this maintains the status quo of 
under-development.  Development discourses strip the problems of poverty of intractable 
political content in order to portray the technical efficiency and efficacy of the foreign 
administrative apparatus. The mission of poverty reduction justifies the existence, 
interventions and perpetuation of the aid industry and its elites who depend on foreign aid 
as a source of power. Via aid planning, an effective network of power is established over 
subalterns in the South (Escobar, 1993: 133-134).   
 Development planners seek administrative legibility out of situations of social and 
political complexity and, in doing so, implicitly subscribe to high modernist notions of 
progress as both feasible and achievable (Scott, 1998). Aid defers rather than creates 
opportunities for the sustainable eradication of poverty as it distracts attention from the 
structural, capitalist sources of under-development.   As a result, neo-Marxian radicals 
recommend looking beyond development, advocating the dissolution of aid planning 
architectures and aid experts in particular in favor of celebrating indigenous social 
movements and local practical knowledge (Escobar, 1993, Escobar, 1995a, Ferguson, 
1994, Scott, 1998, Mitchell, 2002). This ‘post-development’ position is also shared by a 
subset of organizational studies scholars who theorize the negative consequences of the 
modernism implicit in contemporary understandings of international development 
management (Banu O Zkazan, 2008; Cooke, 2004; Cooke & Dar, 2008b; Dar, 2008; 
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Murphy, 2008). This school of ‘critical development management’ views the idealized 
application of modernist management to questions of development, especially via the 
administrative apparatus constituted by foreign aid, as fundamentally pernicious to the 
interests of those who believe in emancipatory development and democratic organization. 
While more recent work has begun to consider the possibility of reconstructing 
development into a more democratic and progressive force, this remains a minority 
position among the radical left.iv  
Radical	  continuities	  and	  discontinuities	  
While there have been attempts to counter the left wing radical critique that all aid 
is an object of oppression and right wing radicalism that aid must exclusively choose 
between planning hierarchies and free markets (with positive emphasis on the latter) 
(Barder, 2009), there has been little or no work to date exploring how these two ‘radical’ 
perspectives on foreign aid relate to each other and how their joint pessimism might be 
transcended.   
For both the neo-liberal and neo-Marxist radicals, there are a number of 
commonalities across their criticism.  First, it is the politico-administrative system within 
which foreign aid is situated that is blamed as a source of failure.   Both variants of 
radicalism converge on the limitations of the planning processes within the aid industry 
that either prevents foreign aid from achieving its stated goals or else worsens the status 
quo of under-development.  Post-war aid architectures are claimed to have universally 
failed to achieve their goal of removing poverty and kick-starting industrialization in the 
then newly independent states.  Secondly, the aid industry is understood to be a global 
hegemonic complex that cultivates peripheral states dependent on benevolent interests in 
the global core. Similarly, dependency effects are felt at the citizen-level and limit 
possibilities for agency, entrepreneurship and empowerment.   Thirdly, the aid apparatus 
that has justified its own existence in terms of the reduction of poverty does not 
adequately target or stridently alleviate the institutional sources of under-development, 
for example the iniquities within the global capitalist system or the asymmetries 
governing international trade policy.  Lastly, the aid industry survives by ensuring 
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sustainable demand for its expertise and services, in other words its existence is 
predicated on the continuation of poverty and under-development.   
Despite these shared criticisms by aid radicals, there is some reason to believe that 
the appearance of convergence is more than a little deceiving.  Divergences between the 
two perspectives are perhaps greater than shared radical concerns.  For aid radicals of the 
left, aid is the source of concentrated oppressive power for both national and trans-
national elites.  This limits the possibility of emancipation of the sub-alterns aid claims to 
champion.  For the radical right however, elites that represent market interests rather than 
the heavy hand of the state can be a source of prosperity as they usher in greater 
opportunities for trade, financial investment and economic growth.   Moreover, for neo-
Marxists aid is a vehicle that strips the problem of poverty from its political causes and 
consequences in order to perpetuate the myth of quick achievable development wins and 
unproblematic modernization processes.  This de-politicization of the poverty problem is, 
in fact, decidedly political as it entrenches the conditions of under-development and the 
power of elites (Ferguson, 1994). Radicals of the right may look beyond aid but they still 
see scope for technocratic development via trade policy, economic openness, voucher 
systems and micro-lending.   These solutions subscribe to the tenets of free markets with 
little consideration of the political economy involved in their operation.  In addition, aid 
radicals of the left understand the aid project as part and parcel of neo-liberal agendas 
serving the interests of capitalism while paying lip service to social justice and human 
rights concerns, the traditional mainstay of social movements and indigenous knowledge.  
Meanwhile, for those on the right, aid sustains cumbersome and inefficient donor 
bureaucracies that contribute to the overall lack of performance of the industry.  The aid 
industry approximates an anti-competitive cartel and possesses an anti-market bias that 
stifles innovation and accountability from aid recipients.  By contrast, radicals of the left 
are not concerned by the lack of efficiency within aid planning but by the way planners 
orders realities in ways that preserves governmentality by the state. 
 
 If aid management is oppressive for the radical left then, it is inefficient and 
ineffectual for the radical right.  If aid effectiveness requires more market-based solutions 
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and mentalities for those on the right, for the left it is only social movements’ 
commitments to justice and their embedded local knowledge that can bring about the 
dramatic transformation needed to address the conditions of under-development.  It 
would thus seem that the differences that distinguish right and left wing aid radicals are 
more significant than may first appear. Nonetheless, their ultimate conclusion concerning 
the value of foreign aid is identical, namely that it is an ineffectual vehicle for generating 
development that is not only harmful but also expendable.    
 
Glass	  half	  full:	  reforming	  aid	  for	  greater	  effectiveness	  
 While there are numerous responses to the radical critique of aid, all of them 
commonly converge on ways to improve the ways aid is organized, managed and 
delivered in order to enhance its development impact. Contemporary aid reformers 
represent a long line of figures since US President Harry Truman committed to support 
an administrative and professional space called ‘foreign aid’ in 1949 (Rist, 2002, 
Escobar, 1995a). As disappointment with aid’s achievements has ebbed and flowed, so 
too have ideas around how to reinvigorate it to achieve the ambitious vision Truman first 
proposed for “improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” (Truman, 1949). The 
reform of aid is now a multi-million dollar business (Riddell, 2007) linking a diverse 
array of guidelines circulating in the development policy sphere on how to fix the 
problems with aid.  
With some notable exceptions, most contemporary aid reformers share an ideal of 
improvement that borrows from managerial logics (Easterly, 2008, Sachs, 2005, Whittle 
and Kuraishi, 2008).v  Managerialism is defined as a “set of beliefs and practices, at the 
core of which burns the seldom-tested assumption that better management will prove an 
effective solvent for a wide range of economic and social ills” (Pollitt, 1990: 1). While 
managerialism shares with the concept of ‘technocracy’ a belief in the possibility of 
planning, technocracy is more commonly a reference to rational Weberian bureaucratic 
systems (Parkin, 1994: 19). In contrast, managerialism is premised on the inherent 
inadequacies of traditional public administration and advocates the insertion of business 
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logics into public affairs (Pollitt, 1997: 52, 56). A characteristic feature of managerialism 
is thus a relatively uncritical acceptance of corporate management in all administrative 
contexts.  
While managerialism has been part of American administrative ideology for 
nearly a century, it gained new force on both sides of the Atlantic beginning in the early 
1970s as a way to downsize the sluggish and inflexible administrative systems of the state 
(Lynn, 2006).  This was initially in the context of demands for cost-reduction and 
efficiency enhancements to the public sector that fanned out across the world as a global 
principle of government reform (Minogue et al., 1998, Bowornwathana, 2000, Haque, 
1996, Sahlin-Andersson, 2001, Hirschmann, 1999, Desai and Imrie, 1998). The term 
‘New Public Management’ (NPM)vi was coined to characterize the similarity of the neo-
liberal administrative doctrines applied to public sector reform in all of these countries 
(Hood, 1991).  Beyond the public sector, managerial elements are also visible within 
international organizations like the World Bank (Murphy, 2008a, Murphy, 2008b) and 
non-governmental organizations (Roberts et al., 2005, Lewis, 2001).   
Contemporary aid reformists have been some of the most optimistic adherents to 
managerial logics and their application to aid administration and planning as a way to 
coax improvement and higher performance.  And yet, there are flimsy empirical 
foundations for advocating managerialism as a platform for reform. (Pollitt, 1997: 67). 
Managerialism stands accused of assuming high levels of equivalence between public 
and private realms that discounts the conflicting goals characteristic of public 
environments (Pollitt, 1990); of being applied dogmatically and by centralizing control in 
a manner can be inherently anti-democratic (Kilby, 2004, Enteman, 1993:184); of 
replacing civic virtues, moral purposes and public service sentiments with substantive 
procedures of management motivated by efficiency (Parkin, 1994: 79, Pollitt, 1990: 138); 
of creating new hierarchies and systems of authority with a powerful managerial elite at 
its apex (Murphy, 2008a, Murphy, 2008b); of introducing generic “cookbooks of action” 
that are often not tailored to local circumstances (Pollitt, 1997); and of generally 
producing outcomes in contrast to original claims and objectives (Diefenbach, 2009, 
Parker, 2002).  Notwithstanding these concerns, managerialism’s success comes from its 
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perceived legitimacy as a framework governing corporate excellence and from the 
apparent universal application of its principles.   Managerialism thus serves as a powerful 
contemporary ideology whose influence is exercised through organizations (Enteman, 
1993: 154). What follows is an exposition of how managerialism is infiltrating reformist 
positions within the Great Aid Debate and generating proverbs concerning the nature and 
directions of aid reform.   
 
The	  goal	  of	  corporate-­‐style	  administrative	  modernization	  in	  aid	  
 Managerialism has its eye on achieving a state of improvement and modernization 
to public administrative systems. It attributes the need for improvement to ever-changing 
and fast-paced external environments of the corporate world where reform is assumed to 
be immanent and inevitable (Diefenbach, 2009).   The underlying untested assumption is 
that public bureaucracies are poorly performing in such environments and can be 
formally restructured along the lines of the private sector in order to generate efficiency 
and results (Pollitt, 1997: 52, Pollitt, 1990: 120). Organizational legitimacy is 
increasingly obtained by the adoption of business logics, even if sometimes their pursuit 
can distract from the real achievement of desired results (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, 
Moynihan and Pandey 2005).  This risks administrative reform becoming an end itself, 
driven by a normative doctrinal consensus on the superiority of business planning.  
Aid reformers assume a teleological orientation towards the desired state of 
foreign aid improvement, where the design and purpose of reform is oriented to 
administrative modernization of the aid apparatus in line with corporate best practice. 
The justification for continuous improvements to foreign aid is reliant on a rhetorical 
idiom of aid’s failures and imminent crisesvii that together threaten the fragile livelihoods 
of the world’s poor.   The motif of failure and crisis as in the quote below drives the 
momentum to reform and ameliorate foreign aid in the image of the corporate sector.  
Many would argue that the over $1 trillion given in aid to developing 
countries over the past half-century has failed---or at best has not produced 
results.  Development challenges are daunting and vast.  […] Half the world 
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population lives on less than $2 per day.  One billion people cannot even 
sign their own name.  […]  We argue that bringing a few market elements 
into traditional structures of foreign aid might remedy some of the 
shortcomings of today’s bureaucratic and sluggish aid system (Whittle and 
Kuraishi, 2008).   
Aid reformers remain confident that administrative improvement of foreign aid is 
simply a matter of transferring corporate know-how into traditional public bureaucracies. 
The dominant economic metaphors of comparative advantage, strategic niches and lower 
transaction costs inspire common sense understandings and intuitions concerning the 
superiority and appropriateness of business logics as vehicles for the administrative 
modernization of aid agencies. These logics are defined by their commitment to business 
flexibility, de-concentration, innovation, entrepreneurship and flat networks, all of which 
are attributes commonly associated with the private sector.  Managerialism cultivates 
corporate doctrines as a legitimate way to both justify and frame reforms in aid 
administration.    
The	  scientific	  process	  of	  aid	  management	  	  
 Managerialism is an ideology that assumes corporate doctrines operate as a tested 
rational science that can orderly and causally steer changes in the foreign aid apparatus.  
It is in this sense that the ideology of managerialism is inspired by Enlightenment 
understandings of progress as deriving from the application of rational science to control 
complex organizations and propel improved outcomes (Townley, 2001, Townley, 2002, 
Townley, 2008, Barley and Kunda, 1992, Simon, 1946). Managerialist prescriptions are 
advanced with trans-scientific language that emphasizes scientific certainty and universal 
applicability even when scientific emergence and experimentation is untenable or 
uncertain (Pollitt, 1997, Hood, 1998).   
The post hoc justification of certain kinds of aid reforms as scientific best 
practiceviii notwithstanding limited and contested evidentiary bases best illustrates the 
infiltration of managerialist ideology into the development space. To illustrate this, 
consider the widely cited study suggesting that aid works in good institutional and policy 
environments that has been relied upon to justify the World Bank’s decision to allocate 
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aid financing on the basis of recipients’ rankings on international benchmarks of good 
governance (Burnside and Dollar, 2000). Burnside and Dollar’s findings and the policy 
prescriptions for aid selectivity have been widely disputed by many econometricians 
operating within the same 'scientific' canons as the authors (Hansen and Tarp, 2000, 
Rajan and Subramanian, 2008, Roodman, 2007).  Nevertheless, this dispute has done 
little to temper enthusiasm for policies that selectively allocate aid according to the 
strength of national governance systems.   An entire new area of research now builds on 
Burnside and Dollar’s contested findings and ranks donor agencies according to their 
achievement on aid selectivity (Williamson, 2010, Easterly and Pfutze, 2008, Knack et 
al., 2010, Acharya et al., 2004).  This latter body of research, presenting itself as the 
scientific assessment of donor performance, firmly anchors aid selectivity as a best 
practice principle guiding aid agency reform, even where this representation remains a 
controversial and stylized understanding of the original Burnside and Dollar study.ix  
Here, the academics and policy makers involved in advancing reform prescriptions are 
relying on the apparently incontrovertible logic of deductive rational science to support 
specious claims about the determinants of aid effectiveness and donor performance.  Aid 
reformers come to see scientific certainty in managerial prescriptions and scientific 
predictability in expected responses that sit comfortably with their desire for social order 
and control (van de Berg and Quarles van Ufford, 2005: 203). This lulls reformers into 
believing that improved aid outcomes are within easy reach as well as possibly 
jeopardizing the search for the true drivers of improvement. 
Aid	  reform	  via	  abstract	  practices	  
 The scientific and corporate ideology of managerialism provides the basis for a 
managerial practice that derives its power from its universal applicability.  This drives 
managerialism to embrace abstract practices that simplify complexity in order to be both 
portable and generalizable.  The term ‘abstract’ refers to the ways in which specific 
knowledge of local contexts and lived experience is reduced and systematized by master-
chefs into “cookbooks of action” (Pollitt, 1997). These cookbooks are intended as 
explanatory frameworks that can replicate outcomes across time and space (Townley, 
2001, Townley, 2002).  Meanwhile, the master-chefs comprise a new professional class 
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in the public sector whose authority rests on their claims to management expertise 
(Parkin, 1994, Pollitt, 1990). The rise of master’s degrees in development management 
and the phenomenal growth of the consulting industry is testimony to the efforts to 
cultivate this new class of professional aid managers.  These ‘abstract’ managerial 
practices and people both risk becoming anti-democratic elements within the aid 
apparatus to the extent that they provide new mechanisms for social control that can 
bypass citizen input and involvement (Murphy, 2008a, Edwards, 1998, Diefenbach, 2009, 
Murphy, 2008b, Pollitt, 1990).  
The growth of performance measurement and management systems (PMMS) and 
monitoring and evaluation professionals in aid agencies illustrate the widespread belief 
that abstract practices in aid are vehicles for enhanced results.  ‘Results-based 
management’ is increasingly prevalent in the aid sector; some examples include targets 
like the Millennium Development Goals or Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
indicators, global rankings assessing everything from transparency, competitiveness and 
human development and intelligence gathering activities to assess aid agency employee 
performance, project impacts and disbursements. While PMMS systems are expected to 
drive performance in foreign aid by motivating desired actions, promoting learning, 
enhancing efficiency and improving transparency and accountability (Behn, 2003), their 
weaknesses suggest a more treacherous route to results. Not only do they tend to simplify 
highly complex dynamics into numeric indicators that may not capture reality in a 
reliable, unbiased, parsimonious and meaningful manner. It remains a continuous 
challenge to attribute changes in indicators directly to particular activities and actions. 
Meanwhile, a managerial professional class emerges and challenges the authority of those 
with more embedded and embodied forms of knowledge that arguably have more direct 
relevance for the search for results. PMMS tend to cause distortions that can shift 
incentives and drive out concerns over processes and quality. PMMS systems are not 
simple thermometers that objectively take performance readings over time.  Rather, they 
are more like Swedish saunas that “give temperature to a body” by altering the contexts 
within which performance is being measured (Hirschmann, 2002).  Nevertheless, the 
optimism of those seeking reform and improvement of aid management, coupled with the 
institutional imperatives of demonstrating aid performance in some scientifically 
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quantifiable way analogous to the private sector, ensures continual conduct and reliance 
on abstract practices and professionals. 
Efficiency	  and	  impartiality	  as	  values	  in	  aid	  	  	  
Managerial approaches define good administration in terms of efficiency.  While 
efficiency may be valuable if it allows for the satisfaction of a greater number of wants 
given the same stock of resources, reformers tend to forget this basis for efficiency.  
Instead efficiency travels as a powerful corporate metaphor of unquestioned and 
unanalyzed administrative good, even if it comes at the expense of other societal wants 
(Pollitt, 1990: 142, Pollitt, 1997, Goodin and Wilenski, 1984: 512).  To the extent that 
managerialism privileges the value of efficiency without an in-depth understanding of 
citizen wants and the purposes of public service contexts, the pursuit of efficiency makes 
little sense except as the blind emulation of business practice.  The efficiency imperative 
dominates reform agendas within aid agencies, best illustrated perhaps in terms of the 
imperative to reduce administrative costs. The comparative assessment of donor 
administrative costs is undertaken without a clear understanding of tradeoffs in terms of 
opportunities gained or lost (Easterly, 2006a, Easterly and Pfutze, 2008).  Moreover, 
economists acknowledge both the patchy data on aid’s administrative costs and the lack 
of accepted definition of what constitutes these costs that makes comparative assessment 
tenuous.  The premise is simply that “in line with best practices, most agencies agree that 
extreme overhead costs should be avoided” (Williamson, 2010: 18). Efficiency remains a 
cherished managerial value among aid reformers.  
Another reason efficiency dominates as a value in aid reform is that it is perceived 
as value-free, or beyond political and social biases. Neutrality is thus another important 
value for aid reformers.  Managerialism draws a sharp dividing line between management 
and politics, and in doing so privileges impartiality as a dominant value of administration.   
It is in the realm of politics that political leaders set directions and steer decisions based 
on normative judgments. Managers, meanwhile, are expected to concentrate on achieving 
the public will expressed by political leaders by simply executing their directives 
(Edwards, 1998: 562, Aucoin, 1990: 116, Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). This separation 
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forms the foundation for the classic dichotomy in public administration between the 
administrative and political spheres (Simon, 1946, Wilson, 1941).  Nevertheless, there is 
some sense in which administrative practice has failed to maintain the impartiality 
implied by the politics/administration dichotomy.   There have been few coherent 
prescriptions to keep political actors from involvement in implementation issues (Pollitt, 
1997: 91-92).  Meanwhile, public managers can also be entrepreneurial actors involved in 
goal setting and political management (Moore, 1995).  The result is that the 
politics/administration dichotomy is increasingly rejected and the political nature of 
administration recognized (Svara, 2001, Svara, 2006, Rosenbloom, 1993).  
Nevertheless, aid reformers widely subscribe to reforms meant to remain beyond 
political dynamics.  Consider the way the ‘aid effectiveness’ agenda is framed by the 
2005 Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness. Aid effectiveness has taken on a specific 
and dominant meaning under this Declaration where the prescriptions for better delivery 
and management of foreign aid are divorced from political dynamics and relations that 
impinge, for better or worse, on aid. The Declaration defines aid effectiveness in terms of 
five principles captured in twelve indicators: aid recipients exercising leadership over 
development policies and strategies and leading coordination (ownership), donors basing 
their support on recipients’ systems and priorities (alignment), reducing the transaction 
costs of donor interventions (harmonization), introducing PMMS mechanisms (results-
based management) and ensuring commitment and respect between donors and recipients 
(mutual accountability).  The Declaration presents the challenge of aid effectiveness as a 
matter of techno-administrative implementation rather than a problem deriving from the 
power and politics within which all aid relations are situated, including donor-aid 
recipient relations, donor-donor relations and local political dynamics (Hayman, 2009: 
581-582, Hyden, 2008, Booth, 2008). For example, reporting on the Paris Declaration 
indicators has been subject to political interference by both donors and recipients, 
suggesting monitoring and evaluation is never a straightforward and exclusively a-
political matter (Hopper & Birch, 2010: 9).  The Paris Declaration may thus represent an 
“unhelpful” ideal of how aid could be better managed as it appears to exaggerate the ease 
with which aid can be altered to deliver development outcomes.   Recent evaluations of 
the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness confirm this assessment, critiquing its framing 
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as a “technical agreement” rather than a “political agenda for action” (Wood, Kabell, 
Muwanga & Sagasti, 2008: xii) with scant attention paid to the “wider political, 
economic and social contexts in which aid operates” (Hopper & Birch, 2010: 9).   
   
The diversity of arguments in favour of aid reform belies a shared implicit faith in 
the tenets of managerialism for increasing foreign aid’s ability to deliver progressive 
change in developing societies. The ideology and practices of managerialism inspire a 
number of proverbs about the ways better management can improve foreign aid.  The 
reformist agenda is shaped by enthusiastic support for transposing corporate-style 
administrative modernization into aid agencies.  Management processes are more often 
assumed to be a product of uncontestable rigorous scientific investigation rather than the 
result of normative acceptance and collective wisdoms.  Interventions themselves rely on 
abstract practices supported by a managerial class who possess skills that are supposed to 
be both learnable and universally applicable.  The values of managerialism assume that 
impartiality and efficiency are necessary requirements for improving aid’s impact.  
Overall, aid reformers are optimistic about the simplicity, feasibility and desirability of 
managerial prescriptions to ameliorate foreign aid.  Attempts to achieve a more 
'Enlightened managerialism' do little to temper this conviction (de Vries, 2007). The 
future for foreign aid burns bright so long as managerial prescriptions get enacted and 
implemented.   
The	  radical	  reform	  of	  foreign	  aid	  
The contemporary Great Aid Debate features a lively, if somewhat unproductive, 
polemic that pits those who radically denounce foreign aid against those who advocate 
greater focus on its managerial reform. To the extent that either perspective engages with 
the other, aid radicals remain skeptical of reformist managerial utopias, while aid 
reformers denounce the nihilistic critique of radicals.   Rather than collaborating on a 
joint project, each side seems to talk past each other in ways that limit the possibility of 
aid’s radical reform.   Assessing the relative strength of each perspective and declaring 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of such a pitted and intractable division is ultimately a normative, 
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and a moot, point. The question that needs to be asked is whether there is a way to re-
theorize aid and its administration such that it becomes less harmful than radicals suggest 
and more robustly improved than simplified managerial reforms imply.   If such a 
possibility exists, the value of the divisive Great Aid Debate can at least be called into 
question.    
Ending the Great Aid Debate becomes a decided possibility with the continuities 
and discontinuities that separate radicals and reformers now made transparent. Attempts 
to rebuild the credibility and effectiveness of foreign aid first can tackle head-on the 
criticisms of aid radicals, particularly those common to the wide spectrum of political 
views spanned by the radical perspective. In other words, the re-invention of foreign aid 
can address shared radical concerns with aid’s failure to achieve its goals and in may 
cases exacerbate under-development, its inculcation of dependency, its limited focus on 
the structural causes of poverty and its tendency towards self-preservation.  At the same 
time, re-theorizing foreign aid can offer opportunities for engagement that work towards 
removing the conditions of underdevelopment but avoid unwarranted and uncritical faith 
in the tenets of managerialism as the exclusive administrative strategy of reform and 
improvement. The future of aid can therefore be one where there is a deep commitment to 
direct engagement and action to address under-development but that also avoids the 
pitfalls identified by radicals and embraces alternatives to managerialism.  I argue this 
'radical reform' of foreign aid demands the reformulation of its goals, processes, practices 
and values.  A foreign aid that intertwines both radical and reformist perspectives is one 
that considers itself as a contested, commonsensical, contingent and civically oriented 
endeavor.  Such a re-conceptualization pushes the Great Aid Debate beyond its current 
impasse.   
 
 Contestable goals: A radically-reformist foreign aid does away with fixed goals 
and singular prescriptions and embraces aid giving as an act of political contestation 
rather than planned social engineering.   Radicals who claim that aid has not achieved its 
goals ignore the fact that goal definitions in development are both disputed and dynamic.  
Goals like poverty reduction in fact remain deeply controversial, notwithstanding the use 
of language that appears to offer the semblance of coherence and acceptability (Cornwall 
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and Brock, 2005).   Moreover, the objectives of aid change as the meaning of 
development shifts; aid that seeks to pursue development in terms of industrialization is a 
different beast from aid that seeks to pursue human development, national accumulation 
or political emancipation (Pieterse Nederveen, 2001).   Similarly, aid reform cannot be 
conceived as the singular transposition of corporate templates into the public sector as if 
this were the only organizational algorithm in existence. Creating all organizations in the 
mirror image of private corporations does not recognize that humans can coordinate their 
activities and achieve collective goals via a huge variety of organizational templates 
inspired by everything from chess clubs to virtual terrorist networks (Parker, 2002: 202–
209). The dogmatic search for singular administrative solutions in foreign aid is 
ultimately part of its problem (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004).  Accepting the 
contestability of aid's goals and its reform objectives requires any reconceptualization to 
embrace political pluralism and greater uncertainty. The natural state of foreign aid is 
characterized by tension and dynamic change. What is required from aid is an ability to 
steer through morasses of contradictory and evolving objectives while still holding on to 
a (contested) desired ends.  The aid system can thus be made more productive by 
facilitating disagreement and debate rather than consensus and coherence (Eyben, 2010: 




Commonsensical processes: Aid radicals criticize foreign aid for not eliminating 
the structural causes of poverty, while aid reformers assume there exists a scientifically 
proven process by which aid can deliver development outcomes. This debate can be 
addressed by having both sides converge on practical rationality as the underlying 
process involved in foreign aid.  Unlike scientific rationality, practical rationality 
recognizes that accomplishing goals must encompass elements of common sense, 
experiential knowledge and judgment (Townley, 2008: 215).  Practical rationality copes 
with problems pragmatically based on what is possible given existing constraints rather 
than exclusively relying on the logic of deductive science. Adopting pragmatism as a 
process would encourage more humility on the part of aid reformers regarding the 
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effective linkages between aid and development, and expand acceptance that the 
robustness of the link may depend on the exercise of judgment and common sense within 
specific situations.  Practical rationality would also suggest that aid radicals might give 
greater consideration to which variety of capitalism might best tackle the root causes of 
poverty rather than the left’s tendency to reject the notion of capitalist development 
entirely or the right's dogmatic faith in the false truths of neo-liberal prescriptions 
(Chang, 2010).   
 
Contingent practices:  Aid radicals are united in their assessment that aid fosters 
excessive reliance of aid recipients on external assistance and limits the agency of 
citizens. By re-configuring managerial aid practices so that they are both embedded in 
local realities and embodied in life experiences of those involved, it is possible to militate 
against the problems of dependency and disempowerment.  Reducing the physical and 
psychological spaces between developers and those for whom development is sought by 
reducing remuneration differentials and recruitment criteria also illustrate how contingent 
approaches could transcend the disembodied nature of managerial aid practices.  
Participatory methods are a tentative step in this direction, though constant attention is 
needed to ensure these methods themselves do not become universal prescriptions to the 
problem of abstraction and reification in aid that reduces the transformative potential of 
participation (Cooke, 2003, Hickey and Mohan, 2004).   
 
Civic values: To the extent that the aid industry has become a self-perpetuating 
one premised as it is on the continuation of poverty and under-development in order to 
justify its existence and its interventions, there has been a perversion of the democratic 
ethos and humanistic values originally intended as the inspiration of and motivation for 
foreign aid. Professionalization of the aid sector into a sizable industrial complex has 
privileged managerial values of efficiency and impartiality at the expense of civic 
orientations and moral purposes.  This turn of events is not unique to foreign aid; 
increasingly modern public administration is sacrificing the social meaning of the ends 
for the technical efficiency of the means (Parkin, 1994: 112, Edwards, 1998, Pollitt, 
1990, Pollitt, 1997). The future of aid must consider re-introducing public service 
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orientations among aid professionals that challenge the instinct of self-preservation. 
Effective aid is only likely to emerge by violating the tenets of economy and neutrality 
via the principle of ‘administrative activism’ (Edwards, 1998: 570)). 
 
Re-theorizing foreign aid by centrally embracing contestability, commonsense, 
contingency, civic-mindedness is a feasible vehicle for reconciling perspectives on The 
Great Foreign Aid Debate.  But why is this search for integration of the radical and 
reformist perspectives desirable?  Why not let the radicals and reformers continue to 
work at cross-purposes, either denouncing or celebrating aid with unnecessary 
exaggeration?   There are certainly normative reasons to want to see the backside of the 
Great Aid Debate.  First, polarization of aid observers, researchers and practitioners split 
loyalties in such a way that limits the possibility for collective engagement across the 
radical-reformist schism.  This restrains prospects of building foreign aid into a 
mechanism and apparatus that both satisfies the moral imperatives that motivate aid- 
giving and targets the root causes of under-development. Transcending this debate can 
raise awareness of the serious problems that afflict foreign aid and its techno-
administrative apparatus but not to the detriment of remedial actions and alternatives.  
The responsibility of radical critique demands the contemplation of solutions in order to 
avoid complicity in maintaining the status quo of under-development (Corbridge, 1998, 




The dilemma that faces the future of aid involves reconciling radical pessimism 
concerning foreign aid with reformers’ optimistic managerial proverbs for aid 
effectiveness.   Arguably to have any productive future, aid needs to be both sensitive to 
existing criticisms and concerns while still holding onto sensible possibilities for 
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intervention and improvement. Taking this on board requires building bridges across each 
side in the Great Aid debate and turning foreign aid into a ‘radically-reformist’ endeavor.  
To the extent that the future of aid is reframed as a radically-reformist 
engagement by which is meant one that is contested, commonsensical, contingent and 
civically oriented, an end to the Great Aid Debate may be in sight.  Up until now, the 
excessive pessimism of radicals and the unwarranted optimism of reformers has restricted 
attempts to pragmatically shift courses with foreign aid in directions that stand a chance 
of achieving greater effectiveness as defined by both reformers and radicals. Too much 
aid criticism, however warranted, has done nothing to address the status quo for the 
bottom billion that is both real and immediate. Too much aid optimism has blinded us to 
stumbling blocks, instilled false hope and wasted resources. Rethinking foreign aid 
requires reconsideration of a theory of aid and its administration better suited to taking on 
board radical criticisms without giving up on the necessity for action and engagement 
upon which reformist arguments are predicated.  Foreign aid needs to be informed by 
both a radical’s sensitivity to aid’s latent potential to do harm and a reformist’s 
conviction in its potential to be made more effective. Minding, and then bridging, the gap 
between radicals and reformers is thus an important first step for moving towards a truly 
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i Foreign aid is defined here as Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), that is a concessional flow 
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with financial terms stipulated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).   
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contractors.  See Martens, B. (2005) 'Why Do Aid Agencies Exist?', Development Policy Review, 23(6): 
643-663.  Nevertheless, since the bulk of ODA is handled via public sector institutions of government or 
with government representation, namely bilateral and multilateral organizations, we understand the aid 
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iii The aid industry is not universally recognized as a cartel, however.  See Harford, T., Hadjimichael, B. 
and Klein, M. (2004) 'Aid Agency Competition', in World Bank Private Sector Development Vice 
Presidency (ed). Washington, DC. 
iv For example, see Pieterse Nederveen, J. (2000) 'After post-development', Third World Quarterly, 21(2): 
175-191.. 
v Bill Easterly is unusual to the extent that he cam be considered as both an aid radical and an aid reformer. 
This perhaps demarcates an evolution in his thinking more than an attempt to bridge the divide per se.   
Some, however, read Easterly’s book as offering “ no intervention” possibilities.  See Unsworth, S. (2009) 
'What's Politics Got to Do With It?: Why donors find it so hard to come to terms with politics, and why this 
matters', Journal of International Development, 21: 883-894. 
vi NPM is but one managerial school of thought, albeit a significant one. NPM underlines elaborate 
performance management systems, outsourcing to quasi-autonomous agencies, self-regulation, customer 
orientations and total quality management. See Pollitt, C. (1997) 'Managerialism Revisited', in Peters, B. G. 
and Savoie, D. (eds) Taking Stock: Assessing Public Sector Reforms. Montreal, McGill-Queens University 
Press.  
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is strategically presented to justify aid and its reform in the image of corporations as morally inevitable and 
uncontestable.  See Ibarra, P. R. and Kitsuse, J. I. (1993) 'Vernacular Constituents of Moral Discourse: An 
Interactionist Proposal for the Study of Social Problems', in Miller, G. and Holstein, J. A. (eds) 
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Post-Bureaucratic Reform', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 4(1): 67-83. 
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The Market for Aid, Washington, DC.: International Finance Corporation, Stern, E. D., Altinger, L., 
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